It is possible government workers can extract rent from private sector workers by charging high taxes and paying themselves higher compensation, particularly when government workers can collectively bargain. Using a spatial equilibrium model where private sector workers are free to migrate across government jurisdictions, I show that private sector workers'migration elasticity with respect to local taxes determines the magnitude of rent extraction by rent seeking governments. Variation in housing supply elasticities di¤erentially restrains governments' abilities to extract rent from private sector workers. The incidence of a tax increase falls more on local housing prices in a less housing elastic area, causing less out-migration. Governments facing inelastic housing supplies can charge higher taxes without worry of shrinking their tax bases. I test the model's predictions by analyzing how government workers'wages, bene…ts, and employment levels respond to variation in housing supply elasticities driven by topography. I …nd the public-private sector wage gap and employer contributions to health insurance are higher in areas with less elastic housing supplies when public sector collective bargaining is legal. When public sector collective bargaining is outlawed, housing supply elasticity has little to no e¤ect on the public-private sector wage gap or health insurance contributions, but may increase government employment levels.
Introduction
The determinants and justi…cation of the size of the government workforce and government workers'compensation levels have taken on considerable heat in recent years, as many states and localities face budgetary stress. Speci…cally, repealing public sector collective bargaining rights has been targeted as a way to reign in costs. 1 There has long been debate over whether the government acts as a benevolent social planner for its citizens or uses its market power to bene…t its workers and political interest groups. (See Gregory and Borland (1999) for a review of this literature.) In particular, the high unionization rate in the public sector may allow union bargaining to in ‡uence the political process and the decisions of elected o¢ cials (Freeman (1986) ).
State and local governments set tax rates as well as government employment and compensation levels. Thus, government employees could earn rents by charging high taxes and either in ‡ating government employment levels or by receiving increased compensation. This paper analyzes whether the size and compensation levels of government workforce are in- ‡ated in areas where state and local governments have stronger abilities to exercise taxation market power and whether public sector collective bargaining enhances this rent seeking. I develop a model where state and local governments set taxes and the level of government services to maximize government "pro…ts", which can then be spent on government interests, such as an expanded workforce or higher government compensation. I use a Rosen (1979) Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium model where workers maximize their utility by living in the city which o¤ers them the most utility based on the city's wage, rental rate of housing, tax rate, government services, and other amenities. Thus, governments must compete for residents to tax, and workers can "vote with their feet" by migrating away from excessively rent extractive governments, in the spirit of Tiebout (1956) .
The model shows that if state and local governments are using their market power to spend tax dollars on government interests, their abilities to extract rents from their citizens is determined by the equilibrium migration elasticity of private sector residents with respect to local tax rates. Governments must trade o¤ the bene…ts of a higher tax with the cost that a higher tax will cause workers to migrate away, leaving the government with a smaller population to tax. This is analogous to the standard result found in analysis of imperfect competition between product producers where a …rm's optimal price markup over cost is equal to the inverse elasticity of consumer demand with respect to price for the …rm's product.
Unlike …rm competition for consumer demand, I show that a government's market power to charge excessive taxes remains even when there are a large number of governments competing for residents and every government is small. 2 The spatial equilibrium model shows that when a government raises taxes, workers will migrate away to other jurisdictions. However, this out-migration decreases the level of housing demand in the area. Assuming housing supply curves slope up, this decrease in population lowers housing rents. Thus, some of the disutility of a tax increase will be o¤set by an increase in the desirability of local rents, which limits the amount of out-migration caused by the tax increase. Since the local housing markets will respond to government imposed taxes through migration, the government will always have taxation market power. An area's elasticity of housing supply will determine how local housing rents respond to population changes in an area. A tax hike by a government in an area with inelastic housing supply leads to a small amount of out-migration. Housing prices sharply fall due to the decrease in housing demand driven by the tax hike. Thus, governments in housing inelastic areas can charge higher taxes without shrinking their tax base since housing price changes limit the migration response.
If state and local governments exercise more market power in areas with inelastic housing supplies, government spending should be more channelled toward items in the government's interest. While it is not necessarily clear which types of government spending are in the interest of its citizens versus the government itself, I test the model's predictions by analyzing how government payroll, employment, wages, and bene…ts respond to areas'housing supply elasticities.
I proxy for a metropolitan areas's housing supply elasticity using data from Saiz (2010) on the share of land within 50km of a city's center unavailable for real-estate development due to geographic constraints, such as the presence of swamps, steep grades, or bodies of water. With less available land around to build on, the city must expand farther away from the central business area to accommodate a given amount of population, driving up average housing costs. 3 Using county level data from the Census of Governments from 1972-2007, I …nd that government payroll per county resident, the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) govern-ment workers per county resident, and average government workers' wages are higher in metropolitan areas with less elastic housing supplies. A one standard deviation decrease in land available for real estate development increases government payrolls per county resident by 4.8%, FTE government employment per county resident by 1.3% and average government wages by 3.5%.
In addition, I …nd substantially di¤erent e¤ects across states depending on whether public sector collective bargaining is legal. Since public sector unions have an explicit mandate to represent the interests of government employees, they may be able to better channel the government's taxation market power into spending that bene…ts government workers. A one standard deviation increase in land unavailability raises government wages by 4.2% in states which allow public sector bargaining, but has little to no e¤ect on government employment levels. However in states which outlaw public sector collective bargaining, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability raises per capita government employment by 1.8%, and has essentially no impact on government worker wages.
To further analyze whether government workers are receiving excess compensation in areas with less elastic housing supplies, I quantify how the public-private sector wage gap varies across these metropolitan areas using data from the 1995-2011 Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). The CPS-MORG allows me to control for workers'education and demographic di¤erences across areas to see if the higher average wages in housing inelastic areas are driven by di¤erences in worker skill levels. Also, by comparing the public sector wages to similarly quali…ed private sector worker wages, I am able to control for di¤erences in local market wage rates.
Results from the CPS-MORG data further document that land unavailability raises the public-private sector wage gap in states where public sector collective bargaining is legal, but has no e¤ect in states where public sector collective bargaining is prohibited. This …nding is robust to including a host of controls for workers'demographics and characteristics, including dummies for three digit occupation codes. The local government-private sector wage gap is found to be higher in housing inelastic MSAs, even when only comparing MSAs within the same state.
As falsi…cation tests, I show that housing supply elasticity has no impact on the federal government worker-private sector wage gap. Since federal workers' compensation is not derived from government revenues of their place of residence, the market power of the state and local government should have no impact on their wages. Additionally, I show that variation in the state government worker-private sector wage gap does not vary across MSAs, within a state. The public-private wage gaps only vary with housing supply elasticities when the housing supply elasticity variation impacts the government's market power.
The CPS-MORG only reports data on workers'earnings, and does not include data on the value of workers'bene…ts. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that government employees receive more generous bene…ts than similar private sector workers, on average. As a measure of bene…t levels, I use data from the CPS March Supplement on whether workers have employer sponsored health insurance as well as the amount of employers'contributions towards health insurance costs. These data also show that, compared to private sector workers, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases local government workers' probability of being covered by employer sponsored health insurance by 3.9 percentage points and increase employer contributions towards health insurance costs by 5.3% in states where collective bargaining is legal. Local government workers may also receive higher employer health insurance contributions in states which prohibit public sector collective bargaining, but estimates are not always precise enough to rule out a zero e¤ect. Estimates for state government workers are also quite imprecise, but point estimates suggests the state workers also receive slightly larger employer contributions to health care costs in housing inelastic states, with the largest point estimates for states which permit collective bargaining.
Previous work has also found evidence suggesting government jobs o¤er rents over and beyond the compensation provided by similar private sector jobs. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that the average public sector employee is more generously compensated than a similarly quali…ed private sector employee. Krueger (1988) …nds that there are more job applications for each government job than for each private sector job, suggesting that government jobs are more desirable to workers, on average. Additionally, average job quit rates reported from the 2002-2006 Job Openings and Labor Turnover Surveys show that average annual quit rate is 28% for private sector workers, but only 8% for public sector employees. These fact taken together suggest that government jobs are better compensated than private sector jobs, and that there appears to be excess labor supply for these jobs, which is consistent with government workers receiving rents. While this evidence shows that government jobs appear desirable to workers, it is not clear that this desirability is due to rent-seeking behavior of governments exercising market power. This paper shows that an increase in governments'abilities to extract rent directly leads to higher government payrolls and bene…ts expenditures.
The public sector workforce is also highly unionized, enabling government employees to bargain for rents. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) use a spatial equilibrium model to show that if the cost of government taxes to citizens are not completely o¤set by bene…ts of government services, they will be capitalized into housing prices. Similarly, if high levels of public sector unionization lead to more government rent extraction, the public sector unionization rate will proxy for government waste and also be capitalized into housing prices. While Gyourko and Tracy (1991) …nd evidence for both of these e¤ects, it is unclear what drives the variation in taxes and unionization rates across localities. This paper uses housing supply elasticity as a source of exogenous variation in government market power to show collective bargaining laws allow governments to take advantage of their market power to increase compensation. Brueckner and Neumark (2011) consider whether governments can extract more rent from local residents if the government presides over an area with more desirable amenities. They use a similar setup to this paper where pro…t maximizing governments compete for residents by setting local tax rates. They allow local governments to play a game in taxcompetition where the number of competing governments is small. My model di¤ers from theirs by allowing each government to be small when deriving the determinants of market power. They …nd evidence that more desirable amenities increase public-private wage gaps. This paper focuses on the role of housing supply elasticity in governments'market power and analyzes it's interaction with public sector collective bargaining in determining government expenditures beyond wages, including employment levels and bene…ts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 layouts of the model. Section 3 presents empirical evidence, and Section 4 concludes.
Model
The model detailed below uses a Rosen (1979) Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium to analyze how local governments set taxes and compete for residents. In the model, I assume that governments use a head tax to collect revenue, however in reality, most state and local governments use property and income tax instruments. In Appendix A I derive results for the case of a government income or property tax and show the same results. I also abstract away from the political election process in each area. While politics could surely in ‡uence the extent of government rent seeking, my goal is to analyze contributors to governments' abilities to exercise market power if they had a rent seeking motivation.
The nationwide economy is made up of many cities. There are N cities, where N is large. Cities are di¤erentiated by their endowed amenity levels A j ; which impact how desirable workers …nd the city, and their endowed productivity levels j ; which impact how productive …rms are in the city. Workers are free to migrate to any city within the country. Each city has a local labor and housing market, which determine local wages and rents. The local government provides government services and collects taxes.
Government
The local government of city j charges a head tax j to workers who choose to reside within the city. The local government also produces government services, which cost s j for each worker in the city. The government revenue and cost are Revenue j = j N j Cost j = s j N j : N j measures the population of city j: The local government is not benevolent and maximizes pro…ts. These pro…ts could be spent on ine¢ cient production of s j (thus, making the government benevolent, but naive). They could also be directly pocketed by government workers, such as through union negotiations. The local government maximizes:
Workers
All workers are homogeneous. Workers living in city j inelastically supply one unit of labor, and earn wage w j : Each worker must rent a house to live in the city at rental rate r j and pay the local tax j : Workers value the local amenities as measured by A j : The desirability of government services s j is represented by g (s j ) : Thus, workers'utility from living in city j is:
Workers maximize their utility by living in the city which they …nd the most desirable.
Firms
All …rms are homogenous and produce a tradeable output Y: Cities exogenously di¤er in their productivity as measured by j . Local government services impact …rms productivity, as measured by b(s j ): The production function is: 4
4 I assume a perfectly elastic labor demand curve to focus on the role of housing supply elasticity and keep expressions simple. A downward sloping labor demand curve can be added without changing the results.
The labor market is perfectly competitive, so wages equal the marginal product of labor:
Housing
Housing is produced using construction materials and land. All houses are identical. Houses are sold at the marginal cost of production to absentee landlords, who rents housing to the residents. The asset market is in long-run steady state equilibrium, making housing price equal the present discounted value of rents. Housing supply elasticities di¤er across cities. Di¤erences in housing supply elasticity are due to topography as well as other unobserved factors, which makes the marginal cost of building an additional house more responsive to population changes (Saiz (2010) ). The housing supply curve is:
is a vector of city characteristics which impact the elasticity of housing supply, including topography.
Equilibrium in Labor and Housing
Since all workers are identical, all cities with positive population must o¤er equal utility to workers. In equilibrium, all workers must be indi¤erent between all cities. Thus:
Plugging in labor demand and housing supply gives:
Equation (1) determines the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities.
Government Tax Competition
Local governments set city tax rates and the level of government services to maximize pro…ts, taking into account the endogenous response of workers and …rms in equilibrium, equation (1) . Each city is assumed to be small, meaning out-migration of workers to other cities does not impact other cities'equilibrium wages and rents. If there were a small number of cities, each city would have even more market power than in this limiting case. The results below can be thought of as a lower bound on the market power of local governments competing for residents. They maximize:
The …rst order conditions are:
Di¤erentiating equation (1) to solve for @N j @s j and @N j @ j gives:
Population increases with government services and decreases in taxes. Plugging these into
(2) gives:
Combining the …rst order conditions shows that government services are provided such that the marginal bene…t (b 0 (s j ) + g 0 (s j )) equals marginal cost (1) :
This is the socially optimal level of government service. The equilibrium tax rate is:
The elasticity of city population with respect to the tax rate " migrate j can be written as:
Plugging in equation (3) for @N j @ j and rearranging gives:
Substituting this expression into the equation (4) shows that the tax markup can be written as:
The tax markup above cost is equal to the inverse elasticity of city population with respect to the tax rate: While workers are perfectly mobile between cities, worker migration causes shifts along the local housing supply curves. An increase in local taxes would cause workers to migrate to other cities. A decrease in population will cause rents to fall, by moving along the housing supply curve. This decrease in rents will increase the desirability of the city to workers, limiting the migration response to the tax increase. The government takes into account the equilibrium rent response to a tax hike when setting taxes to pro…t maximize. Thus, if migration leads to large changes in local rent, a tax increase will not lead to large amounts of out-migration, since workers will be compensated for the tax with more desirable rents.
To analyze the e¤ect of housing supply elasticity on governments'ability to extract rent from taxes, I di¤erentiate the tax markup with respect to the slope of the inverse housing supply curve, j : @ @ j j s j = 1 > 0:
Equation (5) represents the increased rent response to migration induced by a tax hike in a city with an inelastic housing supply. The equilibrium condition, equation (1) ; shows that out-migration will continue until the negative utility impact of the tax hike has been completely o¤set by changes in the city's wage and rent. In a city with a less elastic housing supply, a smaller amount of migration is needed to push housing rents down to o¤set the negative utility impact of the tax hike. The government can extract more rent through higher taxes in a city with a less elastic housing supply. Note that this result assumes there are a large number of cities. Cities can extract rent even in an environment where there are a large number of competitors because household demand for city residence can never be in…nite in equilibrium. Additionally, this model assumes cities charge a head tax, while in reality most cities and states tax their population through income taxes and property taxes. The amount of rent extraction depends on the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate. Thus, an income tax will depend both on the wage response to the tax rate, as well as the migration response. Appendix A shows that when using an income tax, governments can still exercise more market power in housing inelastic areas.
In the case of a property tax, government revenue will depend on local the rental rate and the size of the tax base. An increase in the property tax rate can decrease government revenue both by incentivizing workers to migrate away, shrinking the tax base, and decreasing housing rents, lowering tax revenue from each household. However, I show in appendix A that the housing supply elasticity will not impact the size of the rental rate decrease in response to a given tax hike. Recall the equilibrium condition, equation (1) : For workers to derive utility U from a local area, the utility impact of a tax increase must be perfectly o¤set by a rent decrease. Thus, the equilibrium rental rate response to a given tax increase does not depend on the local housing supply elasticity. Indeed, the housing supply elasticity determines the migration response required to change housing rents in order to o¤set the utility impact of the tax increase. Thus, a less elastic housing supply decreases the elasticity of government revenue with respect to the tax rate, giving the government more market power when using a property tax instrument. See Appendix A for the full derivation of this result.
Regardless of the tax instrument, governments of cities with less elastic housing supplies are able to extract more rent from their residents. In the next section, I empirically test this prediction.
Empirical Evidence
The model predicts that local governments in areas with less elastic housing supplies will be able to extract more rent from their residents. While this extra money could be spent in a number of ways, it is possible some of it goes to government payrolls, either by expanding the workforce or raising wages. These e¤ects could be especially strong in states where public sector collective bargaining is legal. These unions may be able to better channel the government's taxation market power into spending that bene…ts government workers since they have an explicit mandate to represent the interests of government employees.
To test this, I estimate how local government payrolls, employment, wages, and bene…ts vary with characteristics which impact local housing supply elasticities. Saiz (2010) shows that the topological characteristics of land around an MSA's center impact whether the land can used for real-estate development. Cities located next to wetlands, bodies of waters, swamps, or extreme hilliness have limits on how many building can be built close to the city center, which impacts the elasticity of housing supply to the area. Saiz (2010) uses satellite data to measure the share of land within 50km of an MSA's center which cannot be developed due to these topological constraints. A rent-seeking government is able to charge higher taxes in areas with less land available for development. I z-score the MSA level data from the land unavailability measure and use it as measures of cities'housing supply elasticities. I also aggregate these measures to a state-level index, where I weight each MSA measure by the state population in each MSA. The state-level housing supply elasticity measure is a noisy measure of the overall housing supply elasticity for the state, since the data is only based o¤ of the MSAs covered by Saiz's sample. Table  1 reports summary statistics on these measures. The data cover 47 states (there is no data for Hawaii, Alaska, or Wyoming) and 269 MSAs.
Government Spending Regressions
I measure local government payrolls, employment, and wages using data from the 1972-2007 Census of Governments County Area Employment data. These data report every …ve years on all local government employees within a county. This includes workers which work directly for the county, as well as the municipalities, townships, school districts, and special districts within the county. Table 1 Panel A reports summary statistics on average log county area payroll, employment, and number of full-time equivalent government workers per county resident. I include only the counties within the metropolitan statistical areas covered by Saiz's land unavailability data, since these are the counties used in the regression analysis. Average county-area government wages are calculated by dividing total government payrolls by number of full-time equivalent government workers.
To test the model's predictions, I estimate the following regression:
Y ijt measures the government spending outcome of interest in county i in MSA j in year t. z elast j measures MSA j's level of land availability. As controls, I include year …xed e¤ects, t . Standard errors are clustered by MSA since there is MSA-level variation in housing supply elasticity. The model predicts that the types of spending in the self interest of the government should be higher in areas with less elastic housing supplies. Since higher government wages and employment should likely bene…t government workers, the model predicts:
Consistent with the model, Table 2 shows a 1 standard deviation increase in an MSA's land unavailability increases government payrolls per county resident by 4.8%, increases government full-time equivalents per county resident by 1.3% and increases average government worker wages by 3.5%. The point estimates also show that government employees per county resident increase by 1.1%, but the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. It appears local governments are harnessing their taxation market power to bene…t the interests of their workers.
To assess whether collective bargaining impacts how much extra spending goes to the government workforce, I interact the land unavailability measure with whether the state allows local government workers to collectively bargain. The dataset on public sector collective bargaining laws was originally constructed by Richard Freeman and Robert Valletta in 1985 (Freeman and Valletta (1988) ), and codes the relevant laws for every state and every year from 1955 to 1985. This dataset was later extended by Kim Rueben to cover the years through 1996. This paper uses the extended Rueben dataset, …lling forward the 1996 data through year 1997-2007. These laws have been quite stable during this period, barring the very recent law changes in the last quarter of 2011 in Wisconsin, which is beyond the range of the dataset.
While state laws vary in their exact provisions for public sector collective bargaining, I place the laws into two categories: collective bargaining is prohibited or collective bargaining is either permitted or required. The prohibited category includes statutes which explicitly prohibit state employers from bargaining with worker representatives, but also situations where state law makes no provision for collective bargaining, since courts have typically interpreted this as prohibiting collective bargaining (Freeman and Valletta (1988) ). The permitted or required category includes states which authorize the employer to bargain and which give employee organizations the right to present proposals or meet and confer with the employer, as well as those states which either imply or make explicit the duty of the employer to bargain.
The data contain information on bargaining laws explicitly for teachers, police, and …re…ghters, as well data on laws for other local government workers. I use the law data for "other local government workers" for analyzing the impacts on these aggregate government spending measures. Table 1 Panel B reports summary statistics on these collective bargaining laws. Adding in interactions of land unavailability with the collective bargaining laws gives the estimating equation:
is a dummy for whether public sector collective bargaining was legal in county j in year t: This analysis of collective bargaining laws uses cross-sectional variation in the legality of collective bargaining to identify its impact on government rent-seeking. Frandsen (2011) shows that cross-sectional estimates of the direct impact on collective bargaining on public sector wages tend to be higher than estimates which use longitudinal changes in state laws overtime. While this suggests there may be omitted variables correlated with collective bargaining laws that impact government worker wages, this paper's analysis looks how these laws interact with land unavailability. While I cannot rule out the presence of omitted variables, they would have to interact with land unavailability in how they impact government wages, payrolls and employment to cause bias. Further, Frandsen (2011) shows using longitudinal variation in law changes as an alternative identi…cation strategy is also confounded by trends in states'government wages over time. Using variation in law changes also requires getting data going back to the 1960s. Thus, using cross-sectional variation in collective bargaining laws interacted housing supply elasticity can provide strongly suggestive evidence of a causal channel, but surely cannot fully eliminate all potential omitted variable biases. Table 2 shows that in states which allow public sector collective bargaining, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases government payrolls per county resident by 5.4%, while it only increases payrolls by 1.3% in states which outlaw public sector collective bargaining. Further, this estimate for states which prohibit bargaining is not statistically signi…cant. While these estimates cannot rule out small e¤ects of housing supply elasticity on government payrolls in places which prohibit bargaining, there are appear to be quite large, positive e¤ects where bargaining is legal.
Turning to the e¤ects on employment levels, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability in states prohibiting public sector collective bargaining raises county government employment per county resident by 1.8%, which is signi…cant at the 11% level. The estimates for the impact on the number of full-time equivalent workers per county resident are similar, showing a 1.8% increase. In states which allow public sector collective bargaining, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability has essentially no e¤ect on employment levels, with the point estimate showing a slight decrease in government employment by 0.12%. The number of full-time equivalent government workers appear to rise by 1.2%, but neither of these e¤ects are statistically signi…cant.
Column 8 of Table 2 shows the impact of land unavailability on average government wages in states with and without public sector collective bargaining. Housing supply elasticity has essentially no impact on government wages with bargaining is prohibited. The point estimate shows a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability lowering wages by 0.48%, but the e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. However in states which allow bargaining, land unavailability raises wages by 4.7%. Thus, collective bargaining appears to take advantage of areas'housing supply elasticity market power and raise government payrolls, with essentially all of this extra spending going to higher government wages. In areas where collective bargaining is prohibited, government employment levels appear to slightly increase and may also slightly raise government payrolls to pay for this increase.
To gain further insight into how these local governments elect di¤erent expenditures, I redo these analyses within 19 categories of government spending. Appendix Table A .1 reports summary statistics on government payrolls, employment, FTEs, and wages spent on air transport, corrections, elementary & secondary education, higher education, …nancial administration, …re protection, judicial & legal, other government admin, health & hospitals, housing & community development, libraries, natural resources, parks & recreation, police protection, public welfare, sanitation, water transport, utilities, and other spending not otherwise classi…ed. Note that many counties do not have expenditures in every spending category. Thus, to retain the zeros in the data, regressions run on these data will be estimated in levels, not logs so that 0 spending and employment levels can be included in the regressions. All dollar amounts are de ‡ated by the CPI-U and reported in constant 2000 dollars. 5 Table A.2 reports positive point estimates indicating less land availability raises government payrolls per county resident in 16 of the 19 categories of government spending when collective bargaining is prohibited. Eight of these estimates are statistically signi…cant. In states outlawing bargaining, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases monthly government payrolls per county resident by $14.66 on corrections. Relative to counties' average monthly spending on corrections payroll per county resident of $132, this represents an 11% increase. Similarly, …nancial administration payrolls increase by 8.6% ($15.20, relative to a mean spending of $177), other government admin payrolls increase by 5.9% ($12.50, relative to a mean of $211), housing and community development increase by 10.7%, libraries increase by 21%, parks and recreation increase by 11.2%, sanitation increases by 5%, and water transport increases by 159%. Increased spending on parks & recreation and water transport can likely be attributed directly to the topography in these areas, such as presence of bodies of water and other land features which would be likely be used as park areas. It is hard to o¤er a unifying reason of why the additional speci…c categories show statistically signi…cant responses to land unavailability. Overall, many types of government spending appear in increase in land unavailable areas that have no collective bargaining provisions.
Government payrolls are signi…cantly larger across many government categories in inelastic areas which allow public sector collective bargaining. Table A .2 shows 16 of the 19 categories have positive point estimates of the e¤ect of land unavailability, with 11 of them being statistically signi…cant. Land unavailability raises government payrolls broadly across many types of government spending all states, but signi…cantly more when collective bargaining is legal. Table A .3 shows whether these increased government payrolls led to wage increases for government employees. There appears to be no wage e¤ects in states which prohibit collective bargaining. The point estimates for the wage e¤ects across government categories are 50% positive, 50% negative, with only 2 estimates being signi…cant at the 10% level, which is expected due to running 19 regressions.
In the states which allow collective bargaining, 100% of the point estimates show a positive wage response to land unavailability, with 17 of the 19 being statistically signi…cant. Collective bargaining seems to channel these extra payroll dollars into higher government wages across essentially all types of government spending. Table A .4 show the e¤ects of land unavailability on government FTEs per county resident. In states which prohibit collective bargaining, the categories which showed a signi…cant positive government payroll response to land unavailability also show a statistically signi…cant FTE per county resident response as well. These additional dollars all appear to go to a larger government workforce when collective bargaining is prohibited.
Within states which allow collective bargaining, government FTEs appear to statistically signi…cantly rise in air transport, higher education, and parks & recreation. FTEs fall in elementary & secondary education, and libraries. The other point estimates are a mix of both positive and negative e¤ects. There does not appear to be a clear increase in FTEs in collective bargaining states. Table A .5 looks at government employment counts per county resident and show very similar results as those for the government FTEs.
Local government's taxation market power driven by inelastic housing supply appears to bene…t government workers across all states. When collective bargaining is outlawed, government payrolls slightly increase, with the extra dollars going to increased employment. When collective bargaining is legal, these bene…ts are monetized in higher wages and substantially higher overall payrolls.
Higher average government wages does not necessarily mean that these government work-ers are getting "over paid." It is possible that workers in these housing inelastic areas are more skilled and thus deserve a higher wage. In addition, it could be that the market wage for workers is higher in these housing inelastic areas, thus forcing the local governments to spend more on government wages. To test these theories, I turn to data from the Current Population Survey so that I can directly control for workers'demographic and skill di¤erences, as well as use private sector worker wage data to control for MSA di¤erences in market wages.
Wage Gap Regressions
In this analysis, I focus on public-private sector wage gaps across MSAs as a measure of excess compensation to government employees. By comparing the wages of government workers living in a given MSA to similarly quali…ed private sector workers living in the same area, I control for di¤erences in market wages across MSAs, which could have confounded the previous analysis of the Census of Governments wage data. To measure public-private sector wage gaps across MSAs and states, I use data from the Current Population Survey Merged Outing Rotation groups from 1995-2011. 6 The CPS-MORG is a household survey which collects data on a large number of outcomes including workers'weekly earnings, hours worked, public/private sector of employment, union status, and a host of demographics. I restrict the sample to 25 to 55 year old workers with positive labor income, working at least 35 hours per week, to have a standardized measure of weekly earnings. The CPS's usual weekly earnings question does not include self-employment income so all analysis excludes the self-employed. I also restrict analysis to workers whose wages are not imputed to avoid any bias due to the CPS's wage imputation algorithm (Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) ). I measure earnings using workers'log usual weekly earnings, de ‡ated by the CPI-U and measured in real 2000 dollars. Top coded weekly earnings are multiplied by 1.5 and weekly earnings below $128 are dropped from the analysis. 7 All analysis is weighted by the CPS earnings weights. Table 1 reports summary statistics of workers' log weekly earnings each for workers employed in the private sector, local government, state government, and federal government. 8 Consistent with previous works, such as Gittleman and Pierce (2012) , the raw earnings are higher for all three classes of government workers than for private sector workers. However, these raw earnings di¤erences do not account for di¤erences in the characteristics of workers between the public and private sector. To test the model's predictions, I will control for worker characteristics when evaluating di¤erences in the public private sector wage gap. Additionally, the CPS only collects data on workers'earnings, but not compensation paid to workers in the form of bene…ts. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show using the BLS'restricteduse Employer Cost of Employee Compensation microdata that government employees receive signi…cantly more generous bene…ts than similar workers in the private sector. I will return to the question of bene…ts compensation, but …rst focus on public-private sector wage gaps.
As controls, I include location …xed-e¤ects j ; year …xed e¤ects, t ; and a set of worker demographics which include 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race, Hispanic origin, a quartic in age, and a rural dummy. gov i is a dummy for whether the worker is government worker, z elast j measures land unavailability. Standard errors are clustered by state when using state-level measures of housing supply elasticity and clustered by MSA when using MSA variation in housing supply elasticity.
The nationwide average public-private wage gap is measured by gov : The model predicts that public-private wage gap should be higher in areas with less elastic housing supplies:
I test this prediction …rst using a sample including private sector workers and state government workers. The state-level measure of land unavailability is calculated from a population weighted average of MSA land unavailability within each state. There is likely more measurement error in this state-level measure than in the MSA-level land unavailability measure since it does not include data on the topography of cities and town outside of these MSAs within the state. Assuming this mis-measurement is classical measurement error, the state-level estimates will be biased towards zero.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the nationwide average wage gap between state government employees and private sector workers is -0.112 log points. Consistent with Gittleman and Pierce (2012), after controlling for worker demographics, government workers'earnings are lower than similar private sector workers, on average. However, the state worker-private sector wage gap increases by 0.027 log points in states with a 1 standard deviation increase in land unavailability. This e¤ect is signi…cant at the 5% level. Column 2 of Table 3 adds 3-digit occupation codes interacted with a government employee dummy as additional controls. The e¤ects are essentially unchanged, showing that the public-private wage gap is not driven by di¤ering occupation mixes in the public or private sector related to land unavailability.
Column 3 of Table 3 adds in interactions with laws on whether state workers are allowed to collectively bargain. The estimating equation is now:
(8) Table 3 shows a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability has essentially no e¤ects on government wages when collective bargaining is illegal, lowering government wages by 0.005 log points. This e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant. However, when collective bargaining is legal, a one standard deviation in land unavailability raises the public-private wage gap by 0.026 log points. Figure 1 visually plots this regression to show where each state falls. Figure 1 shows the state government-private sector wage gaps within states which allow public sector collective bargaining are higher in states including California, Vermont, Florida, and Connecticut, but much lower in states such as Iowa, South Dakota, Montana, and Nebraska which lines up with these states'land unavailability. In states which prohibit state workers from bargaining such as Georgia, Virginia, Louisiana, and Utah, there is not relationship between land unavailability and wages.
Column 4 of Table 3 adds in controls for 3-digit occupation code by government worker …xed e¤ects. The results are essentially unchanged. Despite the measurement error in the state-level topography data, I …nd that collective bargaining allows state workers to harness the taxation market power bene…ts from inelastic housing supply and earn rents in the form of higher wages. Prohibiting collective bargaining breaks the link between housing supply and government wages.
Performing the same analysis on local government employees, I compare the wage gaps between local government workers and private sector workers across MSAs. The controls in this setup now include MSA …xed e¤ects and the land unavailability measure is now at the MSA level. Column 5 of Table 2 shows that the nationwide local government worker-private sector wage gap is -0.071 log points. A one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases the wage gap by 0.037 log points and is signi…cant at the 1% level. Column 6 of Table 3 adds in controls for 3-digit occupation code by government employee …xed e¤ects, which show very similar estimates.
Column 7 of Table 3 adds the interactions with whether local worker public sector collective bargaining is legal. Consistent with the estimates from the census of governments, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increase the local worker-private sector wage gap by 0.036 log points in states with collective bargaining, with essentially no e¤ect in states with outlaw bargaining (point estimate of 0.004). Figure 2 plots this regression to show where di¤erence MSAs fall along the regression lines. Within states allowing collective bargaining, the plot shows high local government wages gaps in land unavailable cities including Los Angeles, New York, Cleveland, Chicago, and Portland and low government wage gaps in cities with lots of land to develop including Phoenix, Kansas City, and Minneapolis. Within states outlawing collective bargaining, MSAs with lots of land available such as Dallas, Atlanta, and Houston have similar wages to MSAs with much less land available for development, such as Salt Lake City, New Orleans, and Norfolk.
As further robustness, Column 8 of Table 3 adds in controls for 3-digit occupation by government workers …xed e¤ects, which essentially leaves the results unchanged. To test whether the local housing supply elasticity measures impact local government worker-private sector wage gaps within states, across MSAs, I add controls for state di¤erences in the local government worker-private sector wage gaps. I now estimate:
where j represents an MSA and k represents a state. Columns 9 of Table 3 show that the impact of land unavailability on the local government-private sector wage gap falls slightly to 0.02 log points, but remains statistically signi…cant. Since states have the ability to redistribute tax revenues across local areas within a state, it is not surprising that the within state e¤ects of housing supply elasticity are smaller than the between state e¤ects, where the tax dollars are relatively more protected. Overall, land unavailability consistently has a positive impact the public-private sector wage gap both for local and state government workers when these workers can collectively bargain, while wages are una¤ected when collective bargaining is prohibited.
Teachers, Police, and Fire…ghters
To further gauge how some speci…c government occupations' wages respond to land unavailability and collective bargaining laws, I zoom in to focusing on teachers, police, and …re…ghters. The public sector collective bargaining data has data speci…cally on whether each one of these occupations is allowed to bargain. Table 1 Panel C reports summary statistics on these laws. I redo the same regression analysis as performed on the local government workers-private sector wage gaps above, as in equation (8) ; but use that occupation speci…c bargaining law and only include government workers employed in the given occupation, comparing their wages to the overall sample of private sector workers. Column 1 of Table 4 shows a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increase local teacher-private sector wage gap by 0.011 log points in states which prohibit bargaining and by 0.012 in states which allow bargaining. However, neither e¤ect is statistically signi…cant. While I cannot rule out a zero e¤ect for teachers, I also cannot rule out small to medium size e¤ects. Column 2 of Table  4 adds in controls for state speci…c government wage gaps, allowing the land unavailability parameter to be identi…ed by within-state, cross-MSA variation. The e¤ects still remain statistically insigni…cant, however I also am not able to reject that the e¤ect is the same as previously found when I included the whole sample of all local government workers. The point estimate is now slightly negative, at 0.005 within states allowing collective bargaining. If land unavailability is, in fact, in ‡uencing teacher's wages it must be a small e¤ect.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 repeat this analysis for police. Within states which allow police to collectively bargain, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases the police-private sector wage gap by 0.052 log points. In states which prohibit bargaining, there is a statistically insigni…cant e¤ect of 0.018 log points. When state by government worker …xed e¤ects are added, the estimates fall substantially within states which allow collective bargaining. The point estimate is now only 0.006, however the standard errors cannot rule out an e¤ect equal to estimate for the overall government worker sample (0.019 log points).
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 show similar e¤ects for the …re …ghter-private sector wage gap. The point estimate for …re…ghters in states which allow them to bargain is 0.063 log points, and -0.02 log points in states which outlaw bargaining. Controlling for state speci…c government work …xed e¤ects lowers the point estimate to 0.0178 within states which allow collective bargaining. While the standard errors are too large to rule out a zero e¤ect, this point estimate is very close to that found in the previous analysis which included all government workers. Public sector collective bargaining appears to allow police and …re …ghters to take advantage of inelastic housing supply and receive higher wages, while teachers appear not to bene…t as much. This is similar to Frandsen (2011)'s …ndings that the direct e¤ect of these bargaining laws seems to raise police and …re …ghters wages more than teachers wages. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that government workers'bene…ts are more generous than private sector workers'bene…ts. If the market power of state and local governments allows government workers to earn more desirable wages than similar private sector workers, this should also be true for public-private di¤erences in the generosity of bene…ts.
Bene…ts
As a measure of bene…t levels, I use data from the CPS March Supplement from 1996-2011 on whether workers have employer sponsored health insurance as well as the amount of employers'contributions towards health insurance costs. Panel E of Table 1 reports summary statistics on whether there workers have employer sponsored health insurance, as well as the dollar contribution amount the employer gave toward health insurance premiums. For this sample of workers, I include all workers ages 25 to 55 which are employed. 61% of private sector workers have employer sponsored health insurance, and receive $2233 toward premium costs, on average. 80% of state government workers and 77% of local government workers have employer sponsored health insurance. They receive, on average, $2627 and $2717 of employer contributions toward premiums, respectively. I repeat the previous regression analysis, now with the lefthand side variable as these measures of health insurance bene…ts. I use a linear probability model for wether a worker has employer sponsored health insurance:
where H ijt is a binary indicator of whether the worker has employer sponsored health insurance. I include the same worker demographic controls as in the wage equations. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases local government worker-private sector "health insurance gap" by 3 percentage points in states permitting collective bargaining, while land unavailability has essentially no e¤ect in state which prohibit bargaining (point estimate of -0.001 percentage points). Column 2 of Table 5 adds in government worker by state …xed e¤ects. Even when using only withinstate, cross-MSA variation in land unavailability, a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases the local government worker-private sector "health insurance gap" by 1.4 percentage points in states permitting collective bargaining, and again has essentially no e¤ect in states which outlaw bargaining. Repeating this analysis of state government workers, column 3 of Table 5 shows that there does not seem to be a similar e¤ect on state government worker-private sector "health insurance gap." State government worker health insurance provision does not seems to respond to land unavailability in either states which do or do not permit state government worker collective bargaining. One possible reason for this is that employer sponsored health insurance for state government workers is so wide spread, there is not much a margin for it to vary across space. Additionally, the state-level land unavailability measure have more noise in them than MSA-level measures, since they are imputed from MSA-level measures. This measurement error could lead to a downwardly biased estimate.
To get a more continuous measure of the generosity of employer sponsored health insurance plans, I use data on the dollar amount employer contributed to workers' health insurance premiums. I repeat the analysis, now with the dollar amount of employer contributions toward health insurance, measured in constant 2000 dollars. I run this regression in levels, not logs so that all workers are included, even those which receive no health insurance contributions from their employers.
First looking at local government workers, Column 4 of Table 5 shows a one standard deviation increase in land unavailability increases the local government worker-private sector employer health insurance contribution gap by $143 in states permitting local workers to collectively bargain. Since the average local government worker receives $2717 in health insurance contributions, this represents a 5.3% increase. In percentage terms, housing supply elasticity appears to disproportionately improve local government workers'bene…ts, relative to their wages. Recall Table 3 shows a 3.1% increase in public-private wage gap, while the health insurance contribution gap rises by 5.3%. This is consistent with previous studies, such as Gittleman and Pierce (2012) , which show government workers are particularly generously compensated through bene…ts. I also …nd a positive point estimate of $53 in states which do not allow bargaining, but this estimate is not statistically signi…cant.
Column 5 of Table 5 adds in state by government worker …xed e¤ects. Using only the within state, cross-MSA variation, one standard deviation in land unavailability raises the local government worker-private sector employer health insurance contribution gap by $73 in states allowing collective bargaining and by $71 in states outlawing bargaining. This estimate within states outlawing bargaining is now statistically signi…cant at the 10% level. This suggests that even local government workers in states which outlaw bargaining may be receiving more generous bene…ts due to inelastic housing supply. However, this e¤ect only appears when analyzing MSAs within states, but not between states and thus may be a spurious correlation.
Column 6 of Table 5 performs this analysis on state government workers. A one standard deviation increase in a state's land unavailability increases the state government workerprivate sector employer health insurance contribution gap by $90 in states which permit bargaining, and by $41 in states which outlaw it. However, the standard errors are large, and thus neither of these estimates are statistically signi…cant. While the evidence on bene…ts for state government workers is noisy, local government worker health insurance bene…ts appear to strongly respond to inelastic housing supply when collective bargaining is permitted.
Falsi…cation Tests
The public-private sector wage and bene…ts gaps results presented thus far suggest that collective bargaining enables governments workers to harness state and local governments' taxation market power by extracting rents and receiving higher wages and more generous bene…ts than similar private sector employers. A falsi…cation test of these predictions is to analyze whether the federal government-private sector wage and bene…ts gaps across cities and states exhibit similar properties. Since federal workers are not paid by the state or local government which presides over their location of residence, housing supply elasticity should have no impact on federal workers'compensation. Table 6 reports the same state and local wage gap regressions, but use federal workers instead of state and local workers. The point estimate of the impact of land unavailability of the federal worker-private sector wage gap in states both with and without collective bargaining is statistically insigni…cant, and economically small. The point estimates within states which permit collective bargaining is even negative. Column 2 of Table 6 shows this result using MSA-level variation in land availability and Column 3 shows this using statelevel variation in land unavailability. As predicted by the model, the federal worker-private sector wage gaps are not in ‡ated by the housing supply elasticity of these workers'cities or states of residence.
Performing a similar test on state government workers, I compare the wage gaps between state government and private sector workers across MSAs within states. Since the revenues used to pay state government workers are collected from all areas within a state, the MSA of residence of a state governments should not impact their pay, relative to private sector workers living in the same MSA. I add state …xed e¤ects interacted with whether the worker is employed by the state government as controls:
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the impact of land unavailability on state governmentprivate sector wages gaps is negative within states which permit collective bargaining. A one standard deviation increase in land unavailability lowers the state government workerprivate sector wage gap by 0.030 log points. In states which prohibit bargaining, the point estimate is slightly positive at 0.005. As further falsi…cation tests, I repeat the above analysis looking at public-private sector bene…ts gaps, using the dollar amount employer contributed to workers' health insurance premiums. Column 4 of Table 6 shows these estimates for state government workers, using within-state cross-MSA variation in land unavailability. The e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant, regardless of whether collective bargaining is legal.
Columns 5 and 6 perform this analysis for federal government workers. Using MSA-level variation in land unavailability shows the federal government worker-private sector employer health insurance contribution gap is economically and statistically insigni…cant, regardless of collective bargaining laws. Using state-level variation in land unavailability, the federal government worker-private sector employer health insurance contribution gap appears to be negatively associated with land unavailability in states which do not permit collective bargaining, the opposite of what would be predicted if these workers were bene…ting from rent extraction due to inelastic housing supply. In states which permit collective bargaining, the estimate is negative, but economically and statistically insigni…cant.
As shown in the previous section, state level variation in housing supply elasticity increases state worker-private sector wage gaps in states permitting collective bargaining. However within these same states, variation across MSAs within a state have no, or even negative impacts on the state worker-private sector wage gap. As predicted by the model, geographic variation in housing supply elasticity only impacts government compensation when government jurisdiction also varies across these geographic areas. Further, federal workerprivate sector wage gaps and bene…t gap are una¤ected by state level or MSA level variation in housing supply elasticities, as also predicted by the model.
The empirical evidence shows that housing supply elasticity impacts the average wage gap between public and private sector workers when collective bargaining is permitted. A possible alternative explanation for this result other than rent-seeking and market power is that housing supply elasticity in ‡uences the type of workers state and local governments choose to employ when workers are unionized. The wage gap between public and private sector workers could represent unobserved skill di¤erences between workers employed in the public and private sectors. If this were true, the regressions previously presented which controlled for 3-digit occupation codes should have had much smaller point estimates than those which did not control for occupation, since there is likely less variation in worker skill within occupation than between.
As an additional test of this alternative hypothesis, I assess whether public-private sector workers years of education gaps vary with state and local housing supply elasticities. Table  7 performs the stame analysis used to measure state and local wage gaps, but replaces the left hand side variable with a worker's years of education. If government workers are higher skilled that private sector workers in housing inelastic areas, then this should hold both for observed skills (education) and unobserved skills (which cannot be tested). Table  7 shows that impact of land unavailability on public-private sector education gaps is not statistically signi…cant, regardless of a state's collective bargaining status. This holds in the state government workers sample and local government workers sample. This result is also robust to including 3-digit by government worker …xed e¤ects in both the state worker sample and local worker sample. Within the local worker sample, adding in state by government worker …xed e¤ects also does not change this result. Overall, di¤erences in public and private sector workers'years of schooling to not appear to relate to state and local housing supply elasticities. Government workers'wages and bene…ts in states which permit public sector collective bargaining appear to re ‡ect the taxation market power of state and local governments.
Conclusion
By using housing supply elasticity as exogenous variation in governments'abilities to exercise market power, I show that spending on government payrolls is substantially higher in areas where public sector unions can extract more rent from residents. This suggests that public sector unions are able to use their bargaining power to engage in rent seeking to capture additional tax dollars available from inelastic housing supply. In states which prohibit collective bargaining, inelastic housing supply appears in ‡ate the size of the government workforce possibly leading to less e¢ cient production of government services.
The spatial equilibrium model shows that the scope of governments'market power does not disappear when there is competition between a large number of governments or when each government is small. The local housing market will respond to the tax policy choices of the state and local government, mitigating the disciplining e¤ects of workers'voting with their feet through migration.
It is possible that the unmodeled political system where multiple candidates run for election and campaign for less wasteful government policies could compete away some of this government market power. However, the empirical evidence of this paper suggests that these rents do not get fully competed away.
These results also speak to the welfare e¤ects of land-use regulation policy. While the decision to regulate real-estate development and population expansion has many costs and bene…ts not studied in this paper, these results show that decreasing a city's housing supply elasticity through regulation gives the local government more market power. Thus, the rise in land-use regulations since the 1970s may have had an unintended consequence of increasing rent seeking by governments and leading to overpaid government workers or a larger government workforce. State and local governments appear to take advantage of their market power and some of these rents are shared with government employees.
The amount of rent seeking bene…ting government workers appear to strongly depend on whether these workers can collectively bargain. While this paper cannot speak to whether direct e¤ect of public sector collective bargaining laws on government spending leads to government spending ine¢ ciencies, it does appear that public sector unions take advantage of rent seeking opportunities to bene…t their workers. Thus, repealing collective bargaining rights, as recently done in Wisconsin and attempted by Ohio, may be an e¤ective method in helping state and local government reign in spending to meet budgetary constraints, especially in areas with inelastic housing supplies. However, there are surely many other aspects of how collective bargaining could positively or negatively in ‡uence the e¢ ciency of government spending beyond housing supply elasticity. Further research on other mechanisms through which public sector collective bargaining in ‡uences government spending is needed to fully answer whether public sector collective bargaining helps or harms the residents a government serves.
A Government Taxation under Income and Property Taxes
The local government of city j charges an income tax j to workers who choose to reside within the city. The local government also produces government services, which cost s j for each worker in the city. N j measure the population of city j: The local rent seeking government maximizes:
Workers
All workers are homogeneous. Workers living in city j inelastically supply one unit of labor, and earn wage w j : Each worker must rent a house to live in the city at rental rate r j and pay the local income tax j : Workers value the local amenities as measure by A j : The desirability of government services s j is represented by g (s j ) : Thus, workers'utility from living in city j is:
A.1.3 Firms
All …rms are homogenous and produce a tradeable output Y: Cities exogenously di¤er in their productivity as measured by j . Local government services impact …rms productivity, as measured by b(s j ): The production function is:
I I assume a completely elastic labor demand curve to focus on the role of housing supply elasticity in setting tax rates. The labor market is perfectly competitive, so wages equal the marginal product of labor:
A.1.4 Housing
The housing market is identical to the setting described in the main text in Section 2.4. The housing supply curve is:
is a vector of city characteristics which impact the elasticity of housing supply.
A.1.5 Equilibrium in Labor and Housing
Equation (9) determines the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities.
A.1.6 Government Tax Competition
The government maximizes:
Di¤erentiating equation (9) to solve for @N j @s j and @N j @ j gives:
Population increases with government services and decreases in taxes. Plugging these into (10) and combining the …rst order conditions shows that government services are provided such that the marginal bene…t 1 j b 0 (s j ) + g 0 (s j ) equals marginal cost (1) :
This is the socially optimal level of government service, given the tax rate. The equilibrium tax revenue per capita is:
To analyze the e¤ect of housing supply elasticity on governments'ability to extract rent from taxes, I di¤erentiate the tax markup with respect to the slope of the inverse housing supply curve, j : @ @ j w j j s j = 1 > 0:
The government can extract more rent through higher taxes in a city with a less elastic housing supply with a income tax instrument.
A.2 Property Tax

A.2.1 Government
The local government of city j charges a property tax j to workers who choose to reside within the city. The local rent seeking government maximizes: max j ;s j j r j N j s j N j
A.2.2 Workers
Workers'utility from living in city j facing a property tax j is:
A.2.3 Firms
The production function is:
I assume a completely elastic labor demand curve to focus on the role of housing supply elasticity in setting tax rates. The labor market is perfectly competitive, so wages equal the marginal product of labor:
A.2.4 Housing
A.2.5 Equilibrium in Labor and Housing
Equation (14a) determines the equilibrium distribution of workers across cities.
A.2.6 Government Tax Competition
The government maximizes: max s j ; j j r j N j s j N j :
Di¤erentiating equation (14a) to solve for @N j @s j and @N j @ j gives:
Combining the …rst order conditions shows that government services are provided such that the marginal bene…t (b 0 (s j ) + g 0 (s j )) equals marginal cost (1) ; which is the same …nding for an income tax and head tax:
Plugging (17) into (16) and rearranging shows the equilibrium tax revenue per capita is:
Di¤erentiating the tax markup with respect to the slope of the inverse housing supply curve, j : @ @ j w j j s j = 1 > 0:
The government can extract more rent through higher taxes in a city with a less elastic housing supply using a property tax instrument. In the case of a property tax, as opposed to a head tax, there are four mechanisms through which a tax rate change impacts government revenue. To break these down, I rewrite the tax rate …rst order condition: (20) First, the amount of out-migration driven by a tax hike is in ‡uenced by the local housing supply elasticity. This is the …rst term of equation (20) : Second, the out-migration lowers rents and directly impacts tax revenues since the tax revenue is a percentage of housing rents. This is the second term of equation (20) : However, the housing supply elasticity will not impact the size of the rental rate decrease in response to a tax hike. To see this, recall the equilibrium condition, equation (14a) : For workers to derive utility U from this local area, the utility impact of a tax increase must be perfectly o¤set by a rent decrease. 9 Thus, the equilibrium rental rate response to a given tax increase does not depend on the local housing supply elasticity. Indeed, the housing supply elasticity determines the migration response required to change housing rents in order to o¤set the utility impact of the tax increase. Thus, a more inelastic housing supply decreases the elasticity of government revenue with respect to the tax rate, giving the government more market power when using a property tax instrument.
The third and forth terms of equation (20) show a tax increase raises government revenues from each household and lowers the cost of government services due to out-migration. These channels also appear in the case of a head tax instrument. Notes: Data from CPS-MORG. MSA wage gaps calculated after residualizing wages against 15 dummies for education categories, gender, race, Hispanic origin, a quartic in age, a rural dummy, and year dummies. Regression weighted using CPS earnings weights.
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